做个简单的类比，买股票的时候你可能也只会买几只，但上市的股票有多少个呢：）

(Note: Republished to highlight due to popularity)

Venture Capital investing is a very tough game…and very lucrative if you are good at it. Part of my job at Microsoft is working with VCs, so I have learned a lot about the way they think…and why they say No to 99% of the deals they see.

Fred Wilson has another great post today on Venture Fund Economics which I covered in my previous post. After posting that I remembered a blog post by Jeff Bussgang, of Flybridge Capital Partners. In it Jeff explains why VCs want to see every new startup…but say no 99% of the time.

"As one wise old VC once told me, "the trick in this business is to spend very little time on a lot of deals, and then a lot of time on very few deals."  In other words, see everything to be a better investor, but exert a very tough first filter so that you only spend time on very, very few deals.  In my experience, a typical VC has the bandwidth to actively "spend time" or actively work on only one to two deals at any given time and perhaps 10-20 in a year — as compared to those 300-500 they get exposed to."

What are the odds? - VCs are exposed to about 500 opportunities a year. They spend time seriously looking at about 20 companies a year, and invest in two or three. So, they say no about 99% of the time.

We all say no 99% of the time - I would guess that every one of you reading this blog have a stock portfolio with 5 to 10 individual stocks or mutual funds. There are more than 5,000 publicly listed companies to choose from, and another 5,000 mutual funds. But, out of 10,000 possible companies you chose 10 to invest in. Why? Why did you reject the other 9,990 companies? Obviously there are more than 10 good companies to invest in. Other investors chose to invest their money in the other 9,990 companies…why not you?

We invest in people we know and companies we understand - We do this in our own personal investing, and VCs, with rare exceptions, do the same when they make decisions. We all say no 99% of the time, and we reject perfectly good companies, but we invest in things we feel comfortable with.

Find the right VC match - Don’t be too quick to change your strategy or company pitch just because the first batch of VCs rejects it. It is all about finding the right VC that is interested in what you are doing and comfortable in the market space. Don’t waste time trying to convince a reluctant VC. Move on and spend the time finding the right VC for you…that "gets it" the first time. There are at least 1,000 VCs in the USA. They all have different investment tastes…just like all of us do. Go for it!

(Note: This post was re-published to be featured on our front page of the newsroom.) 

Angel Investor Best Practices

对于所有希望做天使投资和打算找天使投资的人来讲，必看之

I came across this 200-page document today which is a very detailed manual of best practices complete with a glossary written by and for angel investors.  It’s not only great reading for those who are new to angel investing, but it’s must read for any entrepreneur looking to raise angel money.  Why?  Well it’s always helpful to put yourself in other’s shoes to see what they’re trying to achieve and when it comes to angels, there’s no better way to get into their shoes than to read this.

Angel Investor Best Practices

Read this document on Scribd: Angel Investor Best Practices

nve

Getting funded means getting fired

作者：Alexander Muse

You might be surprised to learn that 50% of venture backed startups fire their ceo/founder within the first year.  Of course, if you happen to be a ceo/founder of a venture backed startup you won’t be surprised.

When I received my first term sheet (from Austin Ventures) the signature block included the title, “Interim CEO”.  The good news?  They were upfront, I was out the door as soon as they could find a worthy replacement.  I kept looking until I found a venture capital firm that would back ME and not my 50 page business plan.

Peter Ireland has an interesting post title, “The Dreaded Lunch Invite from Your Venture Capitalist” about this topic.  Peter quotes Barnaby Federer of the Wall Street Journal:

“If you ask a VC what value they add, and you get them after a few drinks, they’ll say, ‘We replace the CEO’ “, he said. And that, he indicated, does not vary with the economic climate.

He goes on to explain how the process (of firing the CEO) starts:

t usually occurs in this manner. The venture capitalist invites the founder out for a friendly lunch. During the meal the venture capitalist brings up a new person who would benefit the company greatly through his connections or industry experience. The venture capitalist explains that although this person is not available to serve on the management team, he could probably find the time to serve as a director. Yes, it would mean making the board larger than originally agreed to by everyone but this guy is a “star”. The founder wishing to please his venture capitalist reluctantly agrees to the change in board size. The new face turns out to be the extra vote the venture capitalist needed to make wholesale management changes. Within a week the board has fired the founding team and replaced them with friends of the venture capitalist. Oftentimes the new board member assumes the CEO role.

His advice is to stick to your guns.  Hopefully your lawyers helped you negotiate a deal whereby you had a balanced board ~ fight tooth and nail to keep that balance.  NEVER GIVE IN!  Peter offers this advice:

The best tactic to employ when faced with this offer is tell the venture capitalist that you 1) can’t recommend someone for a board seat until you are satisfied that they can make an actual contribution, and 2) that since the board is working well it would be preferable to compensate this person–once they have made a tangible contribution–with consulting fees instead of a board position. Finally, if you sense a strong negative reaction from the venture capitalist you can be assured that there’s trouble brewing in River City and it’s spelled with a capital “T”.  He will always have a Plan B for pink-slipping you and it won’t be pleasant. Call your lawyer immediately, and I mean your lawyer not the company’s.

I originally wrote this piece some time ago, but thought it was worth reprinting.  Hope you enjoy…

不要管，继续骚扰。。。

A lot of new entrepreneurs start pitching venture capitalists or angel groups and rejected over and over again, myself included. Entrepreneurs hear the same criticisms across dozens of meetings, which is discouraging. In some cases, you may even have second thoughts about your business, but, before you reconsider your model, consider what is going on.

First, investors use the same critical reasoning for different businesses in related industries as a way of saying “no” politely. For example, with online advertising businesses, your site is not sticky enough. With subscription business, conversion will be too low.

Second, investors are not operational or modeling experts, so their opinion on your business is worth as much as you pay for it: $0. They are experts at convincing entrepreneurs to give them a large portion of a company and the control for the least amount of money.

Third, investors say “no” many times per day, so they are very good at doing it without revealing the real reasoning. Reasoning rarely has anything to do with a model, but it usually has to do with (a) partner personality matches, (b) firm investment focus, (c) other investments by the firm, (d) sector heat, and (e) control.

In general, a new entrepreneur pitching a business should expect to hear “no” between 30 and 60 times before receiving investment. Each “no” meeting can be an opportunity to get closer to a “yes” by learning which aspects of your pitch generate the confusion, resistance, and questions. With each additional meeting, your pitch should get shorter and better. Don’t give up. Be Strong in the face of “Trained Skeptics.”

recently got some comments on a blog post I did a while ago from Yoichiro “Yokum” Taku, a partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati and the blogger behind Startup Company Lawyer, on my post about evaluating one or more term sheets.  By the way, SCL is a great blog and I highly recommend it as a resource.  If you’re looking for a quick education on startup legal issues so you can have an efficient conversation with your own attorney, this is the place to go.

Yokum gave me the following feedback:

At first glance, my initial feedback is that you have overvalued the RORFR/Co-sale and (non-cumulative) dividend rights.  All deals have a ROFR/Co-sale and they are rarely invoked as a practical matter.  West coast deals have non-cumulative dividends, which makes a dividend preference meaningless.  Also, I think that the relative weighting of liquidation preference and anti-dilution is a bit off.  I think that liquidation preference is significantly more important than anti-dilution.

This got me thinking that I should repost my original treatise and see what folks think.  So have a read of the below post.  What do you think?

——————————————————————————————————–

By the time I was in the 9th grade, I had been playing chess for a few years (as in I knew the rules) but I didn’t play seriously and more often than not I lost.  Then one day at the library (remember, pre-internet) I happened to find a book on chess.  So I read the book and almost overnight I became one of the chess “stars” in high school.  In one of the funnier incidents, I started playing chess during lunch hour and was “hustling” money which on one occasion resulted in a kid pulling a knife on me after I relieved him of a few bucks.  True story.

What was it in that book that allowed me to take advantage of the situation?  Well, there was a lot of basic stuff, some general rules and even some strategy, however, the most useful bit of information, initially, was a table on the relative value of pieces.  You know, a pawn is worth 1, a knight/bishop 3, rook 5, a queen 9 and the king “infinite” unless it’s the endgame then it’s more like a 4. Experienced players have a “feel” for this from many games played and they can also break the “rules” by, for example, sacrificing a queen for a rook to get better position.  But these are all things learned from experience and best not tried by a novice.  If you are new to the game, you have no idea.  When you are starting out, having some rules of thumb can make all the difference between winning and getting hustled.

What does this have to do with negotiating term sheets?  Well, I think a lot of newbies get hustled when negotiating term sheets because they don’t know the relative importance of the various terms.  Have you heard the joke about the VC who says, “I’ll let you pick the pre money valuation if I get to pick the terms?”  My goal here is to provide a framework that gives relative value of various terms on a term sheet and allows you to compare them on two dimensions: economics and control (or as my friend Noam Wasserman likes to say, “rich” versus “king”). In the same way that a chess grand master doesn’t need rules of thumb from someone else, if you’re a seasoned negotiator of term sheets then this is probably equally useless.  And no, this is not based on any academic or scientific study.  It’s based on my own experience and, more importantly, that of a few other experts like Dave Kimelberg (Softbank’s GC). 

In my view there are 12 important terms on a typical Series A / B term sheet.  Yes there are other terms and yes sometimes they are important, but if you go with the thesis of keep it simple, then 12 is the magic number.  In terms of rating, the rich/king differentiation is important as different people are after different things so depending upon your motivation you may be inclined to pay more attention to one column than the other.  So without further adieu, below is a table showing them as well as the relative importance:

Term

Rich

King

1. Investment / price

10

-

2. Board of directors

-

8

3. Option pool refresh

10

-

4. Preemptive rights

1

3

5. Andi-dilution protection

5

-

6. Registration rights

1

1

7. Drag along rights

1

5

8. Right of first refusal / co-sale

5

-

9. Dividend right

5

-

10. Liquidation preference

7

-

11. Protective provisions

-

8

12. Redemption

1

-

Here a 10 means it is really important to get as favorable a result as possible on this term, a 1 means it is not so important and a “-” means it doesn’t apply (i.e. a zero).  The cool thing about having something like this is you can use it as a tool to compare term sheets (provided you can determine how favorable or unfavorable each individual term is…more on that below). 

The next part of this post is to provide a range of typical results for each term which will give you a means to rank each term in each term sheet with a “1,3 or 5″ where 1 is “unfavorable”, 3 is “fair” and 5 is “favorable.”  If you aren’t already familiar with the terms in a term sheet, you should check out the model term sheet (basically a template) put together by the National Venture Capital Association. They have other model agreements too, but you will see with the term sheet that they include various options, some discussed here.  Below is a scale for each of the 12 key terms across the two dimensions:

1. Investment/price.  I think there are two ways you can rank price.  One is to rate it relative to your expectation and another is to rate it relative to similar companies (in terms of stage, geography, sector, etc.).  If you don’t have comparables, you can fairly easily get them, for example Dow Jones puts out a quarterly survey of VC deal terms which includes pre-money valuation (send me an email if you want a copy).  If you’re less than 80% of your benchmark, that’s probably unfavorable, if you are within +/- 20% than that’s fair and if you’re over 120%, then it’s favorable.
2. Board of directors.  This term comes down to simple math.  If you give up and don’t have control of the board, that’s unfavorable, if it’s tied, call it fair and if you control it, that is quite favorable.  BTW, the reason I didn’t rate the board control a “10″ on the “king” scale is because even when you give up control, your board members are bound by fiduciary obligations to the firm, i.e. they can’t do whatever they want.
3. Option pool refresh.  Often time this will show up as a separate term in the term sheet, however it is actually just another bite at the apple in terms of price. Traditionally there is a refresh pre-deal so that after the round the company can execute on its hiring plan without needing to expand the pool for 12-18 months.  You will have to develop your hiring budget if you haven’t already.  Given that benchmark and your hiring equity budget, I’d say less than 12 months is favorable, 12-18 months is fair and more than 18 months is unfavorable.
4. Preemptive rights.  As you know, preemptive rights give your investor the right to invest in future rounds.  This is of moderate economic value, however you are giving up some control of future financings.  There is remarkably little variation in how this term gets negotiated, probably because of its relatively low importance in the grand scheme.  I’m told the only area that gets negotiated is whether the investor has an “overallotment right” whereby they can take a portion or all of the pro rata of another investor in the same series who didn’t participate.  That said, unless something unusual is in your term sheet, it’s probably a 1 for rich and 3 for king.
5. Anti-dilution protection. Anti-dilution is a pretty important economic term.  In terms of the range of possibilities, no anti-dilution would be a 5, broad-based weighted average would be a 3 and full-ratchet would be a 1.  I think the vast majority of deals end up as broad-based weighted average. Very few deals avoid it altogether, but it can be done, particularly in later stage or very hot deals.
6. Registration rights.  Reg rights have some economic value and in theory you do give up some control, but in reality they’re close to worthless.  You can push on these and most investors will give in when pressed. You can negotiate when the right kicks in and cutbacks.  But bear in mind that investors will love it if you waste time negotiating this because it is not an important term.  Unless something unusual is going on, I’d rate this a 1 on both dimensions.
7. Drag along rights.  Most deals include drag along rights and like many of the other terms, the key is in the voting thresholds.  I rated this a 1/5 on the rich/king scale. In terms of economics the issue is with regard to a sale of the company where the preferred stock, because of special rights, is indifferent to a deal that would be better for Common.  However, the bigger issue is on the control side of the equation where you could get dragged into a sale that you don’t want to do.  So in terms of rating both the economic and control sides, I would say that if the thresholds are such that a single investor can unilateral drag along, that’s a 1, if it takes 2 or more investors that’s a 3 and if it takes investors plus either a neutral party or Common (you) then it’s a 5.
8. Right of first refusal / co-sale. I rated this a 5 because this is essentially a “lock-up” on the founders stock which seriously affects liquidity and thus value.  It doesn’t really affect control issues.  If you read the actual section of the stock purchase agreement that describes this term it’s several pages of bureaucratic procedures for a sale that in the real world you can’t imagine ever occurring (which they don’t).  As a result, the only real counter party for selling common stock is the other investors or the company with the investors approval and they’re all quite likely to low ball.  Unfortunately, I’ve never heard of avoiding this term completely, so in terms of how to rate it, I’d say that if you can negotiate a right to sell some portion (say 20% on an annual basis) you’re at a 5 otherwise if it’s a standard lockup then you’re at 3.
9. Dividend right.  I rate this a 5 on the economic scale.  In terms of the range, there is no dividend which is a 5, then there is a simple interest dividend which I’d say is a 3 and a 1 would be a compounding dividend.  For some reason, the dividend rate has been 8% ever since I’ve seen term sheets.  You can negotiate the rate, but the bigger battle is whether you pay a dividend and how the rate compounds. 
10. Liquidation preference.  This is a very important economic term that doesn’t have any importance in terms of control.  The issue here is during a sale, how do investors get paid out.  I’d say about 1/3 of deals have a preference at 1X but no participation, another 1/3 have a preference with a cap and participation and the balance a preference with no cap plus participation and that’s pretty much how I’d rate it, i.e. 5 for 1X preference/no participation, 3 if with a cap in the 2-4X range and 1 if with no cap and participation.
11. Protective provisions.  This is very important from a control perspective but not so economically. While there are a ton of these protective provisions, the key ones relate to sale/merger of the company and future rounds of financing. As with other control rights, the key is in the voting thresholds so I’d assess this the same as 7 (drag along rights).
12. Redemption.  Finally, we get to number twelve, redemption rights.  This is an almost worthless economic right.  I’ve never seen or heard of this being exercised and most investors will acquiesce if you push on this.  Unless you see something unusual, I’d rate this a 3.

Ultimately the individual rating combined with the overall importance of each term will allow you to create a weighted average total for each term sheet on both the rich and king dimensions.  While you wouldn’t want to make a decision to take an investment on this alone, it will give you a basic idea of where the strengths and weaknesses of particular term sheets lie.  It also gives some tips for negotiating.  For example, you don’t want to waste your time negotiating redemption rights and attorney’s fees and instead, you want to go to the core of what’s important to you on the rich/king scale.

　　在中国的广告环境下，又一家以人气主持人为核心卖点的公司能否取得持续的高增长？它有多大横向扩展业务的把握？它有望成为一家10亿美元的上市公司吗？

　　如果陷入这些问题，你得到的答案很可能并不乐观。正因此，对于在2000年前后就因《超级访问》而成名的女主持人李静，无论热钱在中国怎样涌动，她都像个局外人：绝大多数风险投资者看不到她的电视节目制作公司低成本扩张的可能性，似乎唯一的选择是将公司卖给业内战略投资者。

　　于是，2007年5月，当红杉资本中国创始合伙人沈南鹏宣布完成对李静及她的东方风行传媒的首轮投资，外界似乎并不容易看懂他的逻辑。过去的两三年间，沈已被业界视为中国最敏于把握退出机会的风险投资者，这一次，他看到了什么别人忽略的信息？

　　沈的答案是：希望李静能成为中国的“家政女王”玛莎。斯图尔特。

　　换句话说，他所投资的并非奥普拉式的超级明星主持人以及因此而来的广告收入，而是一个通过电视节目引导生活时尚、销售相关商品的新型媒体公司。

　　用风投业惯用的说法，这是一个“在名片背面就能描述业务”的商业模式。过去几年里，玛莎的公司年收入保持在3亿美元上下，市值也一度高达40亿美元。这就为李静铺好了前路。

　　保守

　　沈南鹏找到过很多能让资本市场眼前一亮的商业模式，这只是诸多故事中的最新一例。

　　沈进入大众视野，始于2005年底。这一年，他正式转入风险投资业，与张帆一同将硅谷最成功的风投公司红杉资本引入中国。

　　对于任何一名风险投资者，仅以3年的时间框架来评判其成绩，都是近乎武断的。沈南鹏却多少是一个意外：此前他参与创立了携程、如家两家纳斯达克上市公司，并以个人身份投资于分众和易居中国；从2003年底至2007年，连续4年有项目退出，且4家公司总市值超过80亿美元——即使对于职业风险投资者，这也算得上极好的成绩了。

　　创建红杉中国后，沈已主导投资了超过20个项目，虽然迄今尚无一退出，但其中为数不少只欠临门一脚。如果2008年的市景稍好，沈的投资组合中能退出的项目就包括：人和商业、诺康医药、新生源医药、宏梦卡通、匹克体育等。

　　其成绩业界有目共睹。在2007和2008年《环球企业家》通过风投业同行评价完成的“点金之手排行榜”上，作为新兵的沈分列第二、第四位。这或许代表着：如果风投业内人士想找人理财，他会是首选之一。

　　一定程度上，外界对沈南鹏的认知构建于此：8年的投行生涯让他非常懂得判断哪些公司可能得到资本市场认可，而5年的创业经验又让他善于筛选合适的创业队伍。两相结合，沈的成功显得顺理成章。而硬币的另一面是，一些风投业内人士及创业者认为，沈充分发挥了他的投资嗅觉，成为了中国最好的退出导向“机会主义者”——人们猜测，他希望将个人品牌建诸于业界罕见的投资成功率上。

　　这些说法都不无道理，但多少低估了沈南鹏作为一个投资者的复杂性。

　　毫无疑问，沈的双重背景让他拥有其他投资者所不具备的经验，但在以高风险换取高收益的风投业，如果沈只能通过成熟模式的辨识与复制，便不可能获得谷歌、思科甚至腾讯这种因其颠覆性而创造巨大价值的项目。以沈之精明，不会看不到这点，但其性格中又有一种特殊的制衡力量——他承认，自己是个“保守的人”。过往的经历也足以证明这一点：携程创业时，本已算得上富有的沈只拿出60万人民币获得40％的股份，并在随后几轮融资中高度稀释。如果沈不是那么规避风险，他完全可以在携程占有更多的股权。

　　因其保守的一面，沈南鹏永远无法成为赌徒。比如，早在2005年底，他就在一次会议上与诺康医药的CEO进行了一番讨论。聊过之后，感觉是“因为不懂，我很难爱上它”。虽然沈相信生物医药市场存在巨大的机会，但当时他想不通为什么一家还只有一款产品的公司可以生存并壮大，他的本能反应是“害怕”。此后他用了一年多的时间学习相关行业知识，才最终确信自己可以做出投资判断。

　　从这个角度上说，沈南鹏的投资决策同样是一个高难度的平衡：对冲其性格中保守一面的，是他尽可能详尽地了解自己所投资领域的专业知识，让局面可控。

　　比如，据知者称，对东方风行的投资前后摸索了约一年半。一直以来，沈南鹏及其团队都认为中国缺乏一个中高端时尚家居品牌。就此主题，他们考察过一系列相关企业：许多家庭用品公司、女性化妆品公司、以及数不清的厨具公司……他们甚至一度找到一个值得密切接触的投资选择：国内一位知名商业女性试图创办的销售高端家居用品的精品店。但有个让沈感觉无解的问题使他始终未能拍板：如果只是采用逐家开店扩张的模式，品牌的建立需要漫长的时间和大量的营销投入。还有什么差异化手段能事半功倍？

　　直到2007年夏天，沈南鹏经人介绍认识了李静。几次交谈后，李静对于既有商业模式遇到的天花板的感慨，与沈南鹏对于时尚家居品牌的持续思考逐渐汇成一个新问题：为什么不将电视节目变为一种生活方式的展示平台？这就指向了玛莎。斯图尔特。

　　复制玛莎是件知易行难的事。你必须拥有丰富的媒体经验，能够制作出大众喜闻乐见的节目，同时还需要有能力开发产品、管理供应链、把它们卖出去……即使能够找到在内容和经营上独当一面的两个人，怎么让他们有效合作，又是一个管理难题。

　　沈之所以愿意知难而进，本质上仍是因为，当投资的关键点推演到这一步，他已经很有把握：

　　——携程、如家的创业过程，令其对消费者行为的理解有所积累。最近两年里，沈在消费品领域投资了匹克体育、麦考林、人和商业等公司，亦曾考察过PPG、ITAT等国内热门消费品创业公司，进一步加深了对消费品公司如何获得用户、消费品牌如何规模化等问题的思考。

　　——同时，沈一向关注中国媒体产业的投资机会，他早已得出一个结论：既然在中国做媒体生意很难获利，只能靠媒体创建品牌做周边产业的生意。在此领域，他已经有了宏梦卡通这个颇为大胆的尝试。通过将零售业背景的职业经理人与媒体业者结合，2004年成立的宏梦卡通在成立第三年收入即达到2751万，第四年则增至1.3亿元，甚至有望于今年实现IPO.

　　——为判断李静能否成为“中国的玛莎”，沈在长达大半年的谈判与沟通中，抽出时间把国内所有女主持人都观察、研究了一番。一个玩笑是，当被《环球企业家》问及为什么不找国内中产阶级普遍青睐的徐静蕾，沈笑道：“徐静蕾的形象还是太不食人间烟火了，我们想找的是一个有时尚意识的‘大婶’。”

　　当沈南鹏对时尚产品的开发和销售、媒体公司的管理以及投资对象是否具备成功的充要条件这几个问题都能做出清晰而乐观的回答时，就没有什么能够阻止他作出决策。随即，他找来百思买中国区的一名高级副总裁承担东方风行的经营工作。 称得上惊喜的是，李静同样有着不错的商业思维，她能够和沈讨论现金流问题、资产负债问题。

　　学习能力

　　正如东方风行这一项目所展现的，在沈南鹏超乎寻常的投资嗅觉背后，是他依靠清晰的知识结构获得控制力的能力，而这又是基于他超强的学习能力。

　　和沈沟通，你会不知不觉地陷入一个巨大的信息漩涡：他语速极快，仿佛不愿浪费任何人的时间，不间断地推出太多的见解和判断，也有巨大的背景信息做支撑。与通常“从A到B”式的推理不同，沈似乎能在短时间内完成“从A到Z”的推演。同时，他拥有的一个罕见品质是，在吸取信息时能尽可能地摒弃先入之见：对一个项目的好坏，或估值是否得当，当他听到另一种判断，无论与他自己的见解有多大偏差，他也很少急于说服对方，而是像在自己的信息库中打下一个记号般地说：“OK，你是这么想的。”

　　这让学习数学多年的沈如同一台不停完善方程式的机器：他会不停丰富数据，然后阶段性地增减、调整一些变量，让决策尽可能精密可靠。

　　如果剖析沈南鹏的投资理念，至少在目前的阶段，一句话即可说清：中国GDP的增长使人们的可支配收入提升，由此带来巨大的消费服务需求。相应的，他的方法论亦不复杂：如果他和团队能成为尽可能多的行业的专家，他们就可以最大程度地享用中国消费升级带来的投资机会。

　　目前，沈投资也是研究的主题包括：互联网、消费品及服务、连锁、商业地产、媒体、科技应用、生物医药等几个领域。他承认，人的精力总是有限的，于是，沈南鹏所做的就是一个学习曲线的累积：一方面尽可能通过一次又一次的投资深化理解他所熟悉的行业；另一方面不停地问自己，他是否看到了新的可持续成长的行业？如果答案是肯定的，他甚至不在意这些新领域是否符合其个人兴趣，因为“兴趣是可以培养的”。

　　正因此，虽然外界很难了解，但沈南鹏自己有着路径明确的投资线索。比如，他最初接触商业房地产业是参与如家的创立，随后，分众和易居中国这两个个人投资项目深化了他对中国房地产行业的信息源：分众的数据可以告诉他中国的写字楼市场经历着哪些变化，易居则显示着二手房市场的变动。而又因为易居的关系，沈南鹏得以结识恒大地产的许家印、富力集团的李思廉等地产业内举足轻重的人物，他们帮助沈对此领域的认知再次提升。

　　所有这些积累，在某一刻就变成了对投资机会的把握。2008年初，红杉与郑裕彤的新世界集团、资金国际完成了对人和商业的投资。对于绝大多数地产业外人士，人和的商业模式不啻于狂想：它在中国各地的防空洞内经营商场。但沈南鹏在看过之后对其颇感兴趣：他清楚，在复杂的地下工程里将人员和服务组织起来不容易，而一旦这个商业模式形成其客户群，它就可以将一家店里的店长、店员和客户倾数带到其他市场。这些都意味着高复制性和壁垒——也正因为他并非外行，人和的创始人才愿意接受一家风投公司做自己上市前融资的投资者。

　　“你做一件事就算最后没成，也学到教训了。但幸运的是，如果你做成了，学到的是成功的经验和错误的教训，而这些别人都看不到”，沈南鹏说。对他来说，虽然很多决策也可以在一、两周甚至更短的时间内作出，但如果以润物细无声的方式先行做好一切信息储备，决策的品质也就更高。

　　因此，即便承认人的精力终归有限，自2007年起，沈还是有意识地学习起两个新行业：矿业和新能源。

　　到目前为止，矿业仍是个让其未得门而入的领域。连续飞到云南看过几次项目之后，沈依然找不到判断项目的方法：在地质报告出来前，沈这样的业外人士不知如何确认一片矿的储量和价值，但等到地质报告写好，价值就充分反应到价格中了——这让他无法获得相对于竞争对手的判断优势。

　　而在新能源领域，问题相对简单许多。作为中国制造的一部分，无论是国内需求还是出口，风能的相关产品都可能变成一个年销售达100、200亿元的市场，并出现一两家全球顶尖公司。“想想风能行业可能有一家公司今年的收入不过1000万人民币，几年后能够变成10亿元，这确实让我感觉兴奋”，沈如是说。

　　但再次证明其保守一面的是，在资本市场狂热的2007年初，一家即将上市的风能公司找到他，询问是否有意参与上市前的最后一轮融资。当时这家公司并没有具体的营收，只有两个未确定的合同，给沈开出的条件是10倍市盈率及18个月的锁定期。毫无疑问，在市场景气时，只要此项目能上市，市盈率很快能翻上几倍。但沈并未乐享其成，他不停问自己：究竟是下注于公司的基本面，还是市场大势？结论是，如果是跟市场博弈，自己“不够聪明”。最终他选择了放弃。

　　创业者教育

　　以自己“不够聪明”为由，放弃跟进市场热潮，除了因为沈DNA中的保守一面，还基于他自1994-1999年在香港从事投行工作时积累下的金融史知识。比如他会告诫自己，当整个市场的市盈率高达50、60倍时，任何企业做假账的动力都很大。而在投资体育用品公司匹克之前，他在福建晋江对同类公司的尽职调查也格外仔细——他清晰记得，1990年代中期，福建在港的上市公司不乏做假账的历史。

　　必须承认，如果说沈南鹏在行业知识这一层面的积累并非很难学习，其知识架构的另外维度，商业技能和对人的判断则难复制得多——与绝大多数风投业同行不同，沈骨子里始终是个创业者，而他连续两次成功的创业经验让他获得了丰富的实战心得。 沈南鹏称，他的创业意识觉醒于1996年。从事投资银行业的最后3年，他供职于德意志银行在华的债务部门。当时老板让自己考虑怎么赚钱，至于究竟自己做，还是带3、4个人的小团队、乃至10个人的大团队，均取决于其自负盈亏的能力。这就让沈必须思考其业务的差异化竞争方法。

　　其时，诸多跨国投行在华的发债业务集中于争夺财政部、中国银行、建设银行等大型国有机构。沈的一个反思是：这些业务的利润其实不佳，为什么大家仍将精力集中于此？答案是，如果能拿下中国银行到美国这样的项目，银行家本人的荣耀感可能超过对生意本身的精打细算。由此，沈将精力转向帮企业发垃圾债——他承认，这是“摩根士丹利、美林不屑一顾的”——但收益颇佳。仅从交易额排行榜上看，沈所做的交易规模偏小的项目让德银落后于对手，但沈觉得“很快乐”：因为他领导的4个人的队伍给公司带来了利润。

　　1997年，沈所率领的德银债务部门完成了5、6家中国公司的发债。次年，这些客户有一半面临重组，虽然没有义务，沈还是努力帮它们寻找后续融资的渠道。

　　“1998年让我学到很多东西。1997年还是套路化的工作：将中国企业包装一下、获得政府支持、到海外去卖。说起来复杂，做起来其实很简单。1998年就不是简单的交易了：你要针对客户的情况，而且你知道了什么叫‘公司不行了’。”鲜少提及这段历史的沈南鹏对《环球企业家》回忆道。

　　在此之后，沈与梁建章、季琦、范敏等人创立了携程。至少在那个阶段，沈南鹏还远算不上成熟。据说，创立携程之前，沈南鹏已经以个人名义做了一些投资，有与沈相识多年的人士称，沈南鹏一度使用了一张印满其投资项目的名片，上面罗列着包括反黑客软件在内的一些公司。

　　沈同样承认的是，携程2000年3月从软银获得融资时，压力曾很大：看不出公司未来能长到多大，甚至不知道怎么从外界借鉴商业模式，是否应该做点订酒店之外的事……直到2001年，携程每月能做到10万间房间的业务量时，他才确定这是个可以赚钱、甚至可能赚很多钱的业务模式。

　　携程的成功让沈完成了个人的一次升级：创立一家市值一度达到45亿美元的公司，让无数正确或错误的决策与执行最终都沉淀成正面的经验。

　　像所有在2000年前创立的网络公司一样，携程最初也不知道该如何推广品牌。他们曾试图依靠线下广告拉动网站流量，但几乎毫无效果。意识到错误后，沈南鹏等人把纯粹的市场营销变成为业务拓展，用销售手段拓展品牌：比如在机场这样的地点发携程的卡片，以及后来跟国航、招商银行的合作。之后，通过六西格玛，携程与竞争对手在服务质量上的差距彻底拉开。而如家的建立让这种经验进一步放大。如家比携程更容易获得客户——它的店面是最直接的广告——但携程的客户从打入电话到完成订房、订票可能只需2分钟，如家的客户可能在酒店待上48小时，这1440倍的时间差别显然创造了更多的犯错空间。

　　沈南鹏在日后回忆起这些点滴，甚至无法将携程的经历总结为互联网经验，而更像是对B2C商业模式的普遍学习——如何获取客户？又如何留住客户？

　　另一个在携程创业过程中逐渐提升的，是他对于组织架构和业务流程的重视。

　　“如果公司管理不好，乱，很可能因为CEO对组织架构和业务流程的掌握有问题。在携程的时候，我和梁建章就两张图画得最多：组织架构图、业务流程图。”沈南鹏说。可以想象，携程曾经有过类似的痛苦经验：公司有4名创始人，如果每人都对下面发布一个命令，执行力就可能倍受影响。

　　这一经验在沈南鹏投资于宏梦卡通时变得极富价值：与携程多少有些类似，这家创意人士和职业经理人并存的企业，的确需要将每个人的角色和公司流程彻底明确。

　　投资宏梦之初，每次开董事会，沈一定会做的事就是画公司的组织架构图。对这样一家创意主导的公司，很容易产生许多决策权模糊的灰色地带：在一些问题上，究竟是创作人员还是经营人员更有发言权？平时的工作中，信息如何流动、双方如何合作？

　　沈南鹏对宏梦的建议非常切实：每隔几个月，大家一起坐下来画组织架构图，谁对CEO负责？分公司负责人向CEO还是向某个副总报告？销售是向当地管理者报告，还是向全国销售报告？有哪些人之间的联系是实线，哪些人之间的联系是虚线？每个人画的有什么不同？

　　虽然在过去3年间，沈南鹏成为中国媒体业的宠儿之一，但一个似乎很少被问及的话题是：加入红杉资本之初，沈就明确表示自己希望学习先进的投资机制，3年过去，他究竟学到了什么？

　　这是一个让沈颇为感慨的话题：其美国合伙人们分享最多的并非发现苹果和谷歌的心得，而是将40年的投资经历总结为一页纸，其中罗列着39个过往的重大错误。沈说，他果然已经犯下纸上列出的两个错误：投资早期企业时股权太少，以及投资在早期就被估值很高的公司。“美国团队跟我们讲过他们的经验、教训，那时我们觉得有些公司很特别，想试试看。但有些规律是没法改变的，这确实很让人沮丧，但很多东西就是这么共性。”

　　如不介意，请判断这样一个项目的投资价值：它的创始人为中国知名主持人，每周制作着4、5档生活类谈话节目，收入模式为贴片广告。这位创业者算得上进取，过去几年里，她也颇有意于将自己打造为“中国的奥普拉。温弗里”，但电视之外，她以个人品牌打造的女性时尚刊物却并不热卖。

http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年06月26日 21:53 《中国企业家》杂志

　　不管你在哪个行业、身处哪个城市，只要你是以创新的方式在创业，这就是最好的时代

　　文 | 本刊记者 潘虹秀

　　尽管TMT、医药、消费、能源、环保、矿产等领域仍是未来一段时期内VC们的投资热点，但很多VC的投资倾向已开始超越具体的行业。

　　这是他们经历过数个投资泡沫的一大反思。“2005年，WEB2.0曾经那么热，估值那么高，投资额度那么大。现在看来，抢到那些项目，未必就好。”智基创投的合伙人陈友忠评价道。一位地产界的投资者近日向记者一一列举他去年在经济型酒店和房地产行业中没能抢到的项目后，唏嘘不已地说道：“没投资成，是好事。”那些被他点名的项目，如今都遇到了很大的问题，成了当年那些“幸运”投资者的心头之痛。

　　“无论是高科技还是传统行业，我们更看重的是创新性和成长性。”深圳创新投资集团（以下简称深创投）的总裁李万寿说道。深创投是本土最大的VC机构。红杉中国资本的创始合伙人张帆也持类似观点。他认为：“在中国，创新型经济刚刚起步，还有很大的提升空间。”赛富的首席合伙人阎焱说道：“我们什么都可以投。”对那些在各行各业进行着创新的创业者们来说，他们能获得的融资机会要比过去多很多。

　　杀往“二三线”

　　“现在，从北京飞往南昌的航班总是爆满。”金沙江创投的合伙人潘晓峰就为这种爆满做出了贡献。这一年多以来，他频繁地飞往南昌，那里有金沙江所投资的晶能光电企业。他发现现在有很多风投都去南昌寻找机会。这与数年前，潘刚刚跟光电接触时的情况完全不一样。

　　“过去大家只关注广（州）、深（圳）、（北）京、沪几大中心城市，现在更多的VC去二三线城市寻找投资机会。”智基创投的合伙人陈友忠说道。在陈看来，这种变化很大程度上是因为VC行业竞争所致。

　　受国内资本市场热潮的驱动，大量的资金、大量的新人涌进了这个行业。一年前，这还是中文夹杂英文、穿衬衫打领带、手握大把美元、享有“造雨人”和“鹰眼”美誉的VC明星们的天下。一年后，突然冒出一大群从未做过风险投资的“土鳖”，抱着大把人民币，高喊着“PE靠酒量、VC靠胆量”，冲杀进来。那些潜藏多年的本土风险投资也突然浮出了水面。

　　这些没有在国外风险投资企业做过的本土新势力，大多得到了江苏、浙江、广东几大省的民营企业的资金支持。受投资方的影响，他们也更加关注民营老板们所关注的二三线城市的投资机会。最重要的是，他们在这些领地有着深厚的关系网络，比学生时期就留洋的海归派VC有着更本地化的洞察能力。这些富有民营老板本身的创业成功也大大增加了VC们对二三线城市的投资信心。有着本土风投支持的金风科技(36.90,-2.43,-6.18%,吧)、紫金矿业(8.08,0.09,1.13%,吧)、洛钼等在资本市场给风投带来的高回报，刺激着很多的海归派VC将目光投向了更广大的内陆省份。

　　“即使是偏远的内陆也可以有创新的商业模式，你看新疆的美克美家不就做得很好吗？”一位海归派VC说道。而一家本土的财务顾问也看到VC们的这种需求，将投融会开到了苏州、无锡等中小城市。他感叹道：“来的VC一次比一次多，有时参会的VC的数量都超过了企业数量。”这种局面，完全不同于大城市举办的投融会，那里最普遍的风景是企业家们在投融会上满场追着VC跑。

　　回归早期项目

　　“早期项目的投资机会更多。”去年下半年，丁健在接受《中国企业家》记者采访时曾说道。他所在的金沙江创投专注于早期项目。彼时，业界正出现了VC PE化、PE VC化现象。金沙江有点鹤立鸡群。

　　不过，现在更多的人站在了丁健一边。“我以前做了很多TMT项目，现在基本不考虑了，除非是非常早期的项目。”陈镇洪说道。陈于去年下半年离开了他的老东家集富亚洲，在香港创立了天泉私募资本。

　　陈转身早期主要是出于差异化竞争的考虑：“并购领域基本是KKR、黑石的天下。成长期项目有了赛富、鼎晖等不错的创投。我们是新基金，现在规模还小，就做做早期项目。”当然，陈也指望就此能打响天泉这个中国人自己创立的基金品牌。红杉、KPCB在美国的声誉，无一不是因其所投的早期项目最终成为了伟大公司。

　　其实，在过去的很多年，VC在中国投资的基本都是早期项目。这两年，投资增长型阶段VC越来越多，投资的金额也越来越大。IDG的熊晓鸽给出了一个数据：“2006年，在中国的324个项目获得了170.8亿美元，平均每个项目获得了550万美元的投资。2007年，项目均额达到了750万美元。”过去，二三百万美元的投资比比皆是。这种变化产生的原因，主要是因为经过二十多年的积淀，中国有一大批民营企业的规模达到了千万美元级别，利润也有了上百万美元。这促使了相当一批的VC去采摘看似没有什么风险的熟苹果。很多PE也将投资阶段前移，加入了采摘果实的行列。于是出现了VC、PE界限不明朗的现状。

　　不过从今年开始，越来越多的VC和PE认为：“好果子即将被采摘完。VC、PE不分的局面只是暂时的。最终大家都必须凭自己的专业技能生存。”

　　采摘果子变成了哄抢果实，促使一批VC下决心远离这个红海。一位VC感叹道：“市盈率已经从4倍上升到8倍，10倍甚至12倍。”在这种情况下，很多不好的项目也得到了很好的估值。

　　在这种状况下，陈玮把眼光看得更长远：“今年，我们看项目要比去年更严格。看企业5年、10年以上的增长。”去年，陈玮离开呆了七八年的深创投，下海成立了东方富海创投公司。他认为，有经验的VC可以在更早期的项目上发挥专业优势。张帆、李万寿持类似观点，更看好早期项目。张帆说道：“早期项目，现在反而是良性局面，有更广阔的空间。”

　　一位LP也支持VC们去看早期项目：“拟上市也不一定真能上市。即使（在国内）IPO了，(国内的《公司法》对VC )也会有一两年的锁定期。为什么不找个更好的早期项目投资？”

I learned a lot from a recent twitter by Andrew Chen:

“Other people teach you the rules of the game. Venture Hacks teaches you how to play it.”

First, I learned that lawyers are referees, not coaches.

Second, I learned that advisors are the coaches of the startup game.

Lawyers teach you the rules of the game. But they usually can’t teach you how to play it.

Lawyers tell you whether you can do something, within the confines of the law and your existing contracts. Lawyers will also write the contracts and do the filings. But they usually can’t tell you what to do—that’s what coaches do.

Here’s a classic startup mistake that illuminates the difference between a coach and a referee:

You’re negotiating an investment and you’ve agreed to a board with 2 investors, 2 common, and 1 independent.

You’re almost ready to sign the term sheet when your prospective investors say, “Sorry, we forgot, one of the common board seats needs to be the CEO.”

You’re thinking, “I’m the CEO and I was going to elect myself to the board anyway, so that’s fine.” Your lawyer agrees and says, “That’s standard.”

This is a mistake. If you hire a new CEO and he’s aligned with the investors, the investors will gain control of the board. Instead, you should create a new board seat for a new CEO.

A lawyer knows that you’re not breaking any laws or contracts if you give a common board seat to a new CEO. He also knows how to write the contract. But an advisor knows the possible outcomes of that decision.

Third, startups without advisors often assume their lawyers have good business advice. That’s a mistake. You need a coach, not a referee, to teach you how to play the game. And most referees aren’t good coaches (but some are).

Fourth, not every coach is a Phil Jackson. Not every coach has won 9 NBA titles as a coach. The effectiveness of coaches in the NBA varies widely. Why would the effectiveness of advisors be any different? Is your advisor a Phil Jackson?

Fifth, there’s more than one way to play the game. Phil Jackson doesn’t have a monopoly on coaching. And neither do we. Go find a coach who can teach you how to play the game. There’s only one Phil Jackson in the NBA because basketball is a zero-sum game. Fortunately, there’s more than one great startup advisor in the world—life is not a zero-sum game.

　　在创投或私人股权交易中，定价或估价往往是一个最棘手的问题。大家从课本都知道，估价是主观的。估价渉及有形及无形因素。

　　在一些较幸运的情况下，投资者与目标公司之间的估值期望接近，能够逹成共识 .然而，这往往只是偶尔发生。

　　如果有这么大的差距， 我们如何能消除差距？目标公司是否应坚持高估值？ 高估价是一个好现象吗？ 还是这意味着投资者实际上是多付了？这些都是必须考虑的重要因素。

　　在资本巿场中，假如超额多付，它将会很快被巿场力量纠正过来。然而在私人股权交易中，估值往往不是按巿场价值反映。有很多例子証明， 多付的投资只会损害公司的长远增长和企业的可持续性。

　　虽然这听起来很学术， 但个人经验和历史告诉我，估值必须是一个“公正的估价”，一个对投资者及公司均可行的数值。

　　如果公司得到投资者的较高估价，这看来很好，但假如公司未能交付成果，即投资者的回报得不到满足， 便会为公司带来回火，因前一轮的高估值另进一步筹集资金设下高壁垒， 并使得贸易出售及并购困难， 这都是公司筹集资金时必须考虑的一些重要因素。

A Few Thoughts, Pre‐Pitch…

Where possible, research the investor or firm you are meeting with. Tailor the presentation to their affinities. Why might there be good synergies? What past investmentshave the made they complement your work? Do they blog? Are there specific things they are looking for in potential investments or entrepreneurs? Call someone at one of his or her portfolio companies (it will trickle back to them and make you look good).

• Let the CEO lead all talks but have someone highly technical there for reinforcements and specific tech‐y questions.
• If at all possible, wait until you have a demonstrable product (i.e. a working alpha) before starting the pitch process. Many VC’s now will just want a team background and to then see the product. They may not even ask for the deck.
• Make sure you pack any projector converters you will need. Ask an assistant ahead of time to confirm whether you will have wireless access, only if you need it.

Four Steps to a Great Pitch:

1. Tell them what you are going to tell them: Show them where you are going to take them, on the title slide.
2. Tell them how you are going to tell them: Have an agenda slide and stick to it.
3. Tell them: make sure the body of your presentation always reinforces your opening point.
4. Tell them what you told them: wrap up, recap and go for the close

Obvious, but make sure you can justify/defend your underlying assumptions in the financials. Need an example of how to create financial projections? Guy Kawaski links to an excellent example. You can even download the template! Guy Kawasaki on the 10‐20‐30 Rule

Possible Format for Power Point (Using Key Note may be better):

1. Cover Slide: Logo, name of presenter, date. Spice it up with a quote from a well known authority justifying the need for someone like you, or you specifically
2. Intro Slide: List key team members. Have you raised some money already? Verbally describe the story of how you all came to be; the company story. Prove you come from the community you aim to serve. Two attributes most VCs look for in a founding team ‐ deep tech skills and capable sales skills, so stress these.
3. DEMO: Show the investor something visual (prototype/wireframes) so they can see what the hell it is your working on
4. What Do You Want? Amount Seeking, etc. Be realistic and know EXACTLY what you are going to do with the funds once they hit the bank account
5. Team: Give each team member a slide with small picture. Skip these slides during the pitch if it seems like overkill
6. Problem/Opportunity: What problem are you solving? Why is it important? A personal anecdote is always good. How big is the market opportunity you are pursuing and how fast is it growing? Do you have a credible claim on being one of the top two or three players in the market?
7. What is the Revenue Model? How do you make money? What is your revenue model? What is required to become profitable?
8. Solution: How does your product or service fix the issue(s) from above?
9. Technology:
10. Marketing:
11. Sales:
12. Competition:
13. Milestones:
14. Contact Page:

After you have your PowerPoint, draft up a one‐page executive summary. This is all you will need. Check out Venture Hacks for Advice on what to send to an investor. Don’t bother asking them to sign an NDA. You also may want to create a high concept pitch.

To Help Drive Content & Refine the Message

What Union Square Ventures looks for:

1. A technology enabled service business
2. Potential to change the structure of markets
3. Information technology leverage
4. Data asset (Defensibility)– At Union Square Ventures, we look for companies that have a data asset. We think that the most valuable data assets are created when users interact with services on the web.
5. A Strong Management Team

What Union Square DOES NOT invest in

What Charles River Ventures Looks for:

1. The team, its authenticity and empathy for the user experience. Do the founders speak the language of their customers? Do they empathize with their customers’ pain? Do they feel passion for their users?
2. Unfair advantage. This is the elusive secret sauce that sets you apart from all of your competition. What about your business and your approach can’t be done by anybody else? Unfair advantage can manifest itself as proprietary and differentiated technology, a superior business model, an incredible team iterating on past success solving similar customer pain, or a network of relationships that drives down customer acquisition costs.
3. Attractive market. Let’s imagine that I’m the most cynical financier possible and the one and only thing that matters to me is delivering economic returns to my investors. I’d be looking for businesses that served the entire world population and whose customers were completely price insensitive.

What First Round Capital Looks For

Be prepared for questions. Review Guy Kawaski’s, 9 Questions to Ask a Startup:

1. How many outstanding shares of stock are there?
2. What is the monthly burn rate?
3. How much cash is in the bank?
4. When will the company achieve positive cash flow?

Thanks to Sam Huleatt from LeveragingIdeas.com for permission to reprint his ‘Pitch Monster’, good stuff!